In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique DecaixBrian Francis ConollyVéronique Decaix. Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback, $48.00.Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect, as presented in his De origine rerum praedicamentalium, has proved unusually resistant to contextualization within the philosophical and theological discussions at the (...) University of Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century. There is little indication in the quodlibet literature that any of his contemporaries were aware of his unusual doctrine, let alone interested in responding to it, and Dietrich himself provides few hints as to which quaestiones of contemporary interest he is responding to. One therefore welcomes this study by Véronique Decaix in which it is argued that "il est irréfutable que les concepts centraux du De origine ont été forgés dans une discussion permanente avec Henri de Gand" (223). Drawing upon and developing the work of Pasquale Porro, Jan Aersten, and others, Decaix establishes Dietrich's indebtedness to Henry of Ghent, all while providing a comprehensive and remarkably clear, detailed, and precise presentation of Dietrich's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect. [End Page 706]Particularly noteworthy is the manner in which Decaix clarifies that there are several distinct ways in which the intellect, on Dietrich's theory, exercises its constitutive power. Thus, for instance, "categorial constitution," whereby certain relations and the six posterior relative categories are constituted, is distinguished from "quidditative constitution," wherein a real natural thing is constituted in its quidditative being, which is at the same time the mode or manner in which the intellect constitutes its own proper object. Decaix clarifies that such modes of constitution differ not only with respect to what is constituted, but by the kind of causality exercised by the intellect. Categorial constitution is a kind of formal causality—because it concerns only accidents, and because intellect grasps these accidents "sur une modalité déduite d'un élément extrinsèque" (284)—whereas quidditative constitution is efficient—it is "plus fondamentale, car elle est plus essentielle et plus intérieure" and "s'exerce sur la forme substantielle et cause l'étant en tant qu'étant" (286). In either case, whether the mode of constitution is categorial or quidditative, Decaix makes clear that constitution is not creation, and does not pertain to the reality or absolute entity of the thing affected by the intellect's constitutive power. Rather, constitution in the relevant sense here entails introducing and imposing upon the real natural thing a new mode of being: with respect to categorial constitution, that mode of being is ad aliud (to be in relation to another); with respect to quidditative constitution, the constituted mode of being is quidditative being.Decaix argues that Dietrich consciously develops his theory of categorial relation within the framework provided by Henry of Ghent. She cites as evidence, among other factors, that Dietrich concludes his analysis of categorial relation with what Decaix calls the "exacte contre-pied" (154) to question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX: "Utrum circumscripta re sui fundamenti relatio possit signari per nomen primae impositionis?" Dietrich in effect responds: "Si autem ab huiusmodi entibus removeamus actum rationis, tunc secundum nullum modum sunt entia quantum ad id, quod significatur per nomen, sed relinquitur sola realitas et entitas fundamenti" (160).Question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX is still more important for Decaix's argument. For she sees herein more than a germ of Dietrich's doctrine of the constitutive power of the intellect. As Decaix explains, in addition to the real foundation (quantity or quality) provided by nature, and the pure ratio of relation, provided by the intellect, Henry introduces the modus characterizatus a re, whereby the peculiar nature of the foundation (e.g. the length or the color) particularizes the general notion of the pure relation (157–58). Thus, the real, particular relation, for example, "is shorter than" or "is similar to," arises only from both nature and the intellect as joint contributing causes. In this... (shrink)

Giles of Rome, in his early treatise, De plurificatione possibilis intellectus, criticizes the arguments of Thomas Aquinas against the Averroist doctrine of the uniqueness of the possible intellect on the grounds that Aquinas does not fully appreciate the distinction between material and intentional forms and the differences in how these forms are generated. Nevertheless, like Aquinas, he argues that Averroes' doctrine still results in the apparently absurd consequence that homo non intelligit, i.e., the individual, particular man, this man, does not (...) understand. Giles, however, attempts to respond to certain "radical" Averroists, who, in a bold and clever maneuver, affirm that homo non intelligit. While Giles does effectively argue that homo non intelligit is not the opinion of Averroes, he is unable to demonstrate the absurdity of homo non intelligit in a manner that would be convincing to the Averroists. This is because Giles, like Aquinas, maintains that the intellect is a power of the soul, and thus has a different conception of the relation between body and intellect than do the Averroists, who emphasize the separateness of the intellect. (shrink)

The two studies comprising this dissertation focus upon the contribution of Dietrich von Freiberg, O.P. to late mediaeval problems concerning identity and change in nature. The first study presents Dietrich's theories of the elements and prime matter, and features an extended historical and philosophical critique of Thomas Aquinas' notion of virtual being. It is with this notion that Aquinas attempts to resolve the apparent tension between Aristotle's theory of the chemical mixture and Aquinas' own doctrine of the unity of substantial (...) form. It is argued that virtual being is not a genuine Aristotelian mode of being and in any case does not resolve this apparent tension. Dietrich's own solution follows that of Averroes, maintaining that the elements in the mixed body are diminished from pure act to some degree of potency. It is argued that Dietrich mis-applies aspects of his theory of substantial generation in arriving at this solution. Such diminishment is possible, argues Dietrich, because of the elements' proximity to prime matter. The doctrine of proper form in its proper matter entails that prime matter must be complex, and those "natures" comprising prime matter be punctually indistinct. Thus are the elements themselves punctually indistinct in the homeomerous mixed body. Dietrich's solution is thus problematic precisely because it requires that the elements be capable of interpenetration. ;The second study evaluates, and attempts to situate in its historical context, Dietrich's theory that numerical identity is not preserved in intensive qualitative change. Rather, each new degree of intensity introduces a numerically distinct quality. This is because qualities lack the interiority of essence that substances possess. A survey of contemporaneous sources shows that while there was much opposition to this position, it was not uncommon. The discussion continues with an analysis of Dietrich's arguments that such change also neither is continuous nor entails an infinity of degrees. Degrees of intensity do not correspond with each "now" in the continuum of time. Rather, there must be an indivisible minimum, and intensive qualitative change must therefore be understood as stepwise and discontinuous. (shrink)